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A Look at In re Fabian A.: Examining the Extension 
of Due Process Protections and Failure to Object as 
Waiver in the Juvenile Justice System 
ELIZABETH BANNON† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There is little doubt as to the importance of the protection provided by 
due process to defendants in the American judicial system.  It is of 
particular importance, however, where it applies to the notion of informed 
consent, specifically as it pertains to plea canvasses and whether a guilty 
plea has been entered into “knowingly and voluntarily.”1 
Recently, the Supreme Court of Connecticut established a rule 
requiring that the due process protection of informed consent be extended 
to plea canvasses in the juvenile process.  This decision is in line with the 
national movement towards recognizing that, while the adult and juvenile 
justice systems must be different in order to reflect the inherent differences 
between adult and juvenile offenders, certain due process protections must 
apply to both systems.2 
Shortly after the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision in In re Jason 
C.,3 another issue arose with regards to informed consent—namely, to what 
extent must the court inform a juvenile defendant during a plea canvass4 of 
circumstances surrounding his commitment and sentence in order to ensure 
that the plea is made knowingly and voluntarily? As seen in the case of In 
re Fabian A.,5 the failure of the court in In re Jason C. to establish a 
specific standard of the extent of information provided during a plea 
                                                                                                                          
† J.D. candidate, May 2012, University of Connecticut School of Law.  B.A. Boston University. A 
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ear during the writing of this Note. 
1 See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969) (citing McCarthy v. United States, 394 
U.S. 459, 466 (1969) which establishes, at a federal level, that “if a guilt[y] plea is not equally 
voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void”); State v. 
Godek, 438 A.2d 114 (Conn. 1980) (establishing the “knowing and voluntary” requirement at a state 
level). 
2 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (applying criminal standard of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt to juvenile proceedings); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41, 57 (1967) (applying 
requirements for adequate notice of hearing and confrontation of witnesses to juvenile adjudicatory 
proceedings). 
3 See In re Jason C., 767 A.2d 710 (Conn. 2001). 
4 A plea canvass is a pre-trial proceeding during which time a trial court judge informs the 
defendant of his charges and conditions surrounding the entry of a guilty or nolo contendere plea, at 
which point the defendant either enters a plea or proceeds to trial.  See, e.g., CONN. SUPER. CT. R. 30a-4 
(2011). 
5 See In re Fabian A., 941 A.2d 411 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008). 
 164 CONNECTICUT PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:1 
 
canvass resulted in the Appellate Court’s finding that the plea had not been 
made knowingly or voluntarily because the court failed to adequately 
inform Fabian A. of circumstances under which his commitment might be 
extended. 
While the notions of due process and informed consent are relevant, 
what is most surprising and troublesome about the case of In re Fabian A. 
is the defense counsel’s failure to raise the issue of informed consent 
during the juvenile’s initial plea canvass.  As seen with due process 
generally, the adult and juvenile justice systems seem to be growing more 
and more similar.  Does that—should that—mean that what would 
constitute a failure to preserve a claim (by failing to object during the plea 
canvass) in the adult system also amount to failure to preserve a claim in 
the juvenile system?  
This Note will argue is that while it is important to extend the 
protection of due process to the juvenile justice system, it is of equal 
importance to preserve the flexibility and rehabilitative focus that for so 
long has differentiated the juvenile system from the adult.  The general 
rule, which is to accept a failure to object as waiver of the right to pursue a 
claim at a later date, may be fair and appropriate in an adult criminal 
system. 6 However, extending such rigid restrictions to the juvenile system 
ultimately undermines its very purpose – to hold juveniles accountable for 
their unlawful behavior while at the same time protecting their best 
interest. 
II. BACKGROUND: IN RE JASON C. AND IN RE FABIAN A. 
A. In re Jason C.: Establishing “Knowing and Voluntary” in the Juvenile 
System 
The development of the “knowing and voluntary” requirement during 
plea canvasses in the juvenile justice system in Connecticut began with the 
case of In re Jason C.7  This case involved the commitment of two separate 
minors, Jason C. and Greily L., to the Department of Children and Families 
(“DCF”).  Both juveniles pleaded nolo contendere to various charges 
brought against them and were committed to DCF during separate plea 
canvasses.  To understand the application of the due process requirement 
of “knowing and voluntary” to the admission of a guilty plea, or in the 
cases of Jason C. and Greily L., a plea of nolo contendere, it is important to 
know the facts and history of each case. 
                                                                                                                          
6 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-121h (2011). 
7 See In re Jason C., 767 A.2d at 719. 
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1. In re Jason C.: The Facts 
In August or September of 1996, Jason C., a sixteen-year-old male, 
“allegedly committed an act likely to impair the health and morals of a 
child under the age of sixteen in violation” of Connecticut law.8  On 
February 10, 1997, the Superior Court adjudicated Jason C. a delinquent, 
following a plea of nolo contendere to the charge, and Jason C. 
subsequently was committed to DCF “for a period not to exceed eighteen 
months.”9  In March of 1997, prior to his commitment, Jason C. allegedly 
engaged in sexual conduct with a four-year-old child, once again violating 
the law of the State of Connecticut.10  On October 30, 1997, Jason C. once 
again appeared before the trial court in a plea canvass, this time for the 
adjudication of the charge of sexual assault in the fourth degree.11  He once 
again pleaded nolo contendere.12  Pursuant to the two plea agreements, the 
court committed Jason C. to DCF for eighteen months, effective October 
31, 1997. Subsequently, Jason C.’s commitment was extended by 
agreement between DCF and the court until October 30, 1999 – well 
beyond the original eighteen-month commitment period as originally 
agreed upon during the October 30, 1997 plea canvass. 13  On October 1, 
1999, DCF again filed a petition, this time seeking to extend Jason C.’s 
commitment for an additional twelve months.  It is important to note that at 
no time during either plea canvass, or after DCF filed its second petition 
for extension of commitment, did the trial court advise Jason C. of the 
possibility that DCF could petition for an extension of his commitment.14 
The second juvenile defendant in In re Jason C. was Greily L., a 
seventeen-year-old female.  On April 6, 1998, the Superior Court 
adjudicated Greily L. a delinquent following a plea of nolo contendere to 
the charge of violating a court order.15  The Court committed Greily L. to 
DCF for a period not to exceed eighteen months.  However, as it did during 
Jason C.’s plea canvasses, the Court failed to inform Greily L. of the 
possibility that DCF could petition for an extension of her commitment, 
                                                                                                                          
8 Id. at 712. 
9 Id.  Under Connecticut law, “commitment of children convicted as delinquent by the Superior 
Court to the Department of Children and Families shall be for (1) an indeterminate time up to a 
maximum of eighteen months. . . .”  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-141 (2011). 
10 In re Jason C., 767 A.2d at 712. 
11 Id. at 712–13. 
12 Id. at 13. 
13 Id. Pursuant to CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-141 (2011), “[t]he Commissioner of Children and 
Families may file a motion for an extension of the commitment…(a) beyond the eighteen-month period 
on the grounds that such extension is for the best interest of the child or the community.  The court 
shall give notice to the parent or guardian and to the child at least fourteen days prior to the hearing 
upon such motion.” 
14 In re Jason C., 767 A.2d at 713. 
15 Id. 
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which DCF did on September 23, 1999.16 
On November 22, 1999 and December 3, 1999, both Jason C. and 
Greily L., respectively, filed motions to dismiss the extension petitions, 
claiming in relevant part that “granting the petition to extend commitment 
would violate the plea agreement,” that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-141 was 
“void for vagueness,” and that “granting the petition for extension of 
commitment would violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.”17  The 
trial court granted each motion to dismiss on the grounds that “[f]ailure to 
advise the respondents of a possible extension of delinquency commitment 
prevented them from entering a knowing and voluntary plea, thereby 
rendering the plea invalid.”18 
2. The Effect of In re Jason C. on the Juvenile Justice Process 
The court in In re Jason C., by granting the defendants’ motions to 
dismiss, established a precedent in the Connecticut juvenile justice system 
that “when accepting a plea agreement, due process requires a court to 
advise a juvenile of possible extensions to the delinquency commitment.”19  
Because neither defendant had been advised of the possibility that DCF 
could petition for an extension of commitment—an action that would bring 
their confinement beyond the eighteen month maximum as established by 
Connecticut law, the maximum time they believed they could be 
committed—they did not have “all the relevant information required by . . . 
long-standing and well settled [Connecticut] law.”20  Therefore, the Court 
concluded that “their pleas were not knowing and voluntary,” and thus 
were invalid.21  As a result of In re Jason C., trial courts are now “required 
to advise a juvenile of the possibility that his or her delinquency 
commitment may be extended beyond the period of time stated in the plea 
agreement.”22 
The new standard for acceptance of a juvenile defendant’s guilty plea 
during a plea colloquy mirrors the standard that has been well-established 
in the adult justice system in Connecticut, both in statute and at common 
law.23  In essence, what the court in In re Jason C. did was extend the due 
                                                                                                                          
16 Id. DCF’s petition sought to extend Greily L.’s commitment for an additional eighteen months.  
Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 713–14 (emphasis added). 
19 Id. at 714. 
20 In re Jason C., 767 A.2d 710, 716 (Conn. 2001); see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-141 (2011). 
21 In re Jason C., 767 A.2d at 716. 
22 Id. at 714.  This rule has since been codified into Connecticut law: “To assure that any plea or 
admission is voluntary and knowingly made, the judicial authority shall address the child or youth in 
age appropriate language to determine that the child or youth substantially understands . . . [t]he 
possible penalty, including any extensions or modifications.”  CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 30a-4 (2011). 
23 See, e.g., CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 39-19 & 39-20 (requiring that the “judicial authority . . . not 
accept the [guilty] plea without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that he or she 
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process protection of informed consent required in the adult justice system 
to the juvenile justice system.  In doing so, it acknowledged the Supreme 
Court’s precedent that there are inherent differences between juveniles and 
adults, which require a difference in the law’s treatment of each.24  
However, the court also acknowledged that courts must take special 
caution to balance state objectives in the juvenile justice system against 
notions of fundamental fairness.25  Thus, “[b]ecause of the seriousness 
involved in the institutionalization of a juvenile, and the lack of a negative 
effect on juvenile proceedings,” the court concluded that “a juvenile is 
entitled to be advised of the possibility of commitment extensions when 
making a plea.  The status of being a juvenile does not warrant 
abandonment of the well established rule that a defendant be advised of the 
direct consequences of his plea.”26 
B. “Knowing and Voluntary” Meets Waiver: In re Fabian A. 
The court in In re Jason C. made great strides towards extending due 
process protections inherent in the adult criminal justice system to the 
juvenile system in Connecticut.  It laid out that basic rule that trial courts, 
before accepting a juvenile’s guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere, must 
ensure that the juvenile is aware of the possibility of extension of his or her 
commitment and that the plea is made knowingly and voluntarily. 
However, the court failed to specifically enumerate the extent to which the 
court must advise the defendant so as to ensure that his or her plea is made 
knowingly and voluntarily.  This issue arose in the context of In re Fabian 
A. 
1. Background and Facts 
On August 25, 2005, Fabian A., a fifteen-year-old male, pleaded guilty 
to charges of disorderly conduct and violation of probation.27  The trial 
court adjudicated him delinquent and committed him to the custody of 
DCF for a period not to exceed eighteen months.28  At the outset of the 
                                                                                                                          
fully understands: (1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered; (2) The mandatory 
minimum sentence, if any; . . . [and] (4) The maximum possible sentence on the charge. . . .”); CONN. 
SUPER. CT. R. § 39-20 (ensuring that the defendant’s plea is “voluntary and is not the result of force or 
threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement”).  See also State v. Hall, 992 A.2d 343, 345 (Conn. 
App. 2010), cert. granted in part, 995 A.2d 638 (Conn. 2010) (finding that, by failing “to address [the 
defendant] personally or to determine that he understood that his immigration status might be adversely 
affected by his guilty pleas[,]” the court failed to substantially comply with Connecticut statute). 
24 See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984) (acknowledging the necessity to maintain 
“informality and flexibility” in the juvenile setting). 
25 In re Jason C., 767 A.2d at 718 (looking at In re Steven G., 556 A.2d 131 (Conn. App. Ct. 
1989).  
26 Id. 
27 In re Fabian A., 941 A.2d 411, 413 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008). 
28 Id. 
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plea canvass, the presiding Judge Wollenberg, advised Fabian A. that he 
could ask a question at any time.29  Judge Wollenberg proceeded to ask 
him various questions, pursuant to the rule set forth by In re Jason C., in 
order to establish that Fabian A.’s plea was made knowingly and 
voluntarily.30  After accepting his plea, the court turned to the order of 
commitment.  Upon learning from the probation officer that the requested 
commitment was for a period of eighteen months, the prosecutor asked the 
court to inform Fabian A. as to the possibility of recommitment.31  In 
response, Judge Wollenberg stated, “Well, if [the eighteen month 
commitment] doesn’t work and something happens, you can be 
recommitted, do you understand that?”32  Initially, Fabian A. failed to 
respond verbally and the court instructed him that he must respond with a 
“yes” or “no,” at which point he responded in the affirmative.33 
Fabian A.’s commitment was set to expire on February 28, 2007.  
However, as a result of his behavior while in custody, DCF filed a motion 
to extend his commitment on January 29, 2007.34  Fabian A.’s attorney 
opposed the motion to extend commitment, but on March 22, 2007 the 
court granted the motion and extended Fabian A.’s commitment to January 
19, 2008.35  The presiding Judge Gleeson found that at the time Fabian A. 
had entered his guilty plea he had been “advised adequately as to the 
possibility that his commitment could be extended.”36  
Counsel for Fabian A. filed an appeal on April 9, 2007, asserting that 
Fabian A.’s plea was not entered knowingly or voluntarily because the 
court had failed to properly inform the defendant of the circumstances that 
may lead to an extension of his commitment.  Namely, the court had only 
inquired as to the sentence after accepting the guilty plea, the court “failed 
to make any inquiry of [Fabian A.’s] understanding of the sentence, the 
maximum penalty or the possibility of an extension,” and that it was “only 
at the suggestion of the prosecutor, after the plea had been accepted, that 
the court informed the defendant of a ‘recommitment possibility.’”37  Upon 
reviewing the transcript from the plea canvass, the court held that Fabian 
A. “could not have possessed an understanding of the law in relation to the 
facts because the court, in canvassing him, did not include all the relevant 
                                                                                                                          
29 Id. 
30 Id. Specifically, the court asked Fabian A. “his age, what grade he was in at school, if anyone 
had forced him to plead guilty, if anyone had promised him anything if he pleaded guilty, whether his 
attorney had informed him of how a trial would work and whether he was satisfied with the 
representation of his attorney.”   
31 Id. at 413–14 (emphasis added). 
32 In re Fabian A., 941 A.2d 411, 414 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 416 (emphasis added). 
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information concerning the commitment.  As a result . . . the plea of the 
respondent was not knowingly or voluntarily made.”38 
C. The Defense’s Silence 
The court in In re Jason C. established the rule that a juvenile’s plea 
must be made knowingly and voluntarily; however, it failed to instruct 
future courts as to what exactly is required to ensure that a juvenile is 
indeed making his or her plea knowingly and voluntarily.  Thus, it is no 
surprise that the court found that Fabian A. had not been properly informed 
of the circumstances that could lead to an extension of his commitment; as 
a result, his plea was not made knowingly or voluntarily and was thus 
invalid.  It is important to note that, during the plea canvass, neither Fabian 
A. nor his counsel asked any questions regarding commitment, and counsel 
“did not make a motion to withdraw [the] guilty plea or in any other way 
indicate that Fabian [A.] did not understand the judge’s advisement that his 
commitment could be extended.”39 
III. EVOLUTION OF DUE PROCESS IN THE JUVENILE SYSTEM 
As this Note previously mentioned, there is a general movement in 
both federal and state criminal justice systems towards extending many of 
the protections of due process inherent in the adult system to the juvenile 
justice system.  Included in these protections are the right to counsel, the 
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the right to reasonable 
search and seizure, and the privilege against self-incrimination.40  There 
seems to be a  general consensus that the juvenile justice system requires a 
balance between a strict application of due process rights in the juvenile 
setting and judicial flexibility regarding procedural process, so long as 
“constitutional demands are satisfied.”41  Although these rights are neither 
identical to nor as extensive as those rights guaranteed to adult offenders, 
they may be curtailed for legitimate reasons when doing so “serves the 
state’s interests in promoting the health and growth of the child.”42 
If we are to view the extension of due process protections to the 
                                                                                                                          
38 In re Fabian A., 941 A.2d 411, 417 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008). 
39 Brief of Appellee at 5, In re Fabian A., 941 A.2d 411 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008) (No. 28704). 
40 See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires that children charged with criminal acts enjoy several procedural 
protections).  It is worth noting that, while there is a general consensus among most state courts that 
juveniles should be afforded most of the due process protections afforded to similar adult offenders, 
some states disagree that such an expansion of due process rights to juvenile offenders is warranted.  
See, e.g., Petitioner F v. Brown, 306 S.W.3d 80, 90 (Ky. 2010) (holding that juvenile offenders are not 
afforded all constitutional rights that adult offenders receive; instead, they should be afforded only 
“right to fair treatment”). 
41 47 AM. JUR. 2D Juvenile Courts, Etc. § 83 (2006). 
42 Id. 
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juvenile justice system as a realization of the necessity to protect the 
“vulnerable dependents” within our society,43 it would necessarily follow 
that protections outside of due process may be appropriate in the juvenile 
system as well.  This section will address the development and goals of the 
juvenile justice system, as well as the concept of waiver generally.  It will 
ultimately argue that the rigidity associated with waiver in the adult 
criminal justice system is incompatible with the goals of the juvenile 
justice system – namely, the juvenile justice system was specifically 
designed to be flexible and individualized, affording judges discretion not 
only in their procedures, but in their sentences, so as to keep in line with 
the system’s goals of not only punishment, but rehabilitation.44  
A. History of the Juvenile Courts and Due Process in the Juvenile Justice 
System 
The first juvenile court was established in Chicago in 1899, the direct 
result of a progressive movement in the criminal justice system that 
recognized the fundamental differences between adult and juvenile 
offenders.45  The new court “combined the new conception of children as 
vulnerable dependents with the rehabilitative orientation” of the 
progressive movement.46  In the new juvenile court system, the state took 
on a parens patriae role and, as such, “assessing criminal responsibility 
became subordinate to assuring the social welfare of the child.”47  Because 
the courts were viewed to be “benign” and implementing intervention 
strategies in the children’s best interest, leaders of the progressive 
movement “rejected the [adult] criminal law’s jurisprudence and 
procedural safeguards” finding them to be unnecessary.48  Unfortunately, 
juvenile courts frequently sentenced children to commitment in juvenile 
institutions, often without the due process afforded to adult offenders who 
faced the same deprivation of liberty.49  It is no surprise, then, that the lack 
of procedural protections in the juvenile court system, combined with the 
“sweeping custodial powers [afforded to] juvenile court judges,” soon 
caught the eye of critics and judicial reformers.50 
The most impressive reform of the juvenile court system occurred in 
1964 after the annual meeting of the National Council of Juvenile Court 
                                                                                                                          
43 Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile Courts, 54 
FLA. L. REV. 577, 586 (2002). 
44 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-121h (2011). 
45 See Berkheiser, supra note 43, at 585–86. 
46 Id. at 586. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 587 (citing Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court – Part II: Race and 
the “Crack Down” on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 337–38 (1999)). 
49 See Id. 
50 Id. 
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Judges.51  It was during this meeting that Chief Justice Earl Warren boldly 
announced that, while great latitude is given to juvenile courts with regards 
to procedure, decisions, and sentencing, those courts, like adult criminal 
courts, “must function within the framework of the law and provide 
juveniles with due process protection against capricious decisionmaking” 
to “satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness . . . .”52 
Though the Chief Justice failed to elaborate as to the specific 
protections of due process which should apply in the juvenile setting, his 
remarks served to refocus the goals of the juvenile system and opened the 
door to decisions that very quickly began extending almost all of the due 
process protections from adult criminal courts to those in the juvenile 
system.  The first of the cases to tackle the issue of due process in the 
juvenile court system, thus marking a new era of juvenile justice, was In re 
Gault.53  The Supreme Court, upon careful examination, observed that, in 
the juvenile justice system, “the child receives the worst of both worlds:  
. . . he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care 
and regenerative treatment postulated for children.”54  Thus, in the 
fundamental fairness guarantee, the court found the “jurisprudential basis 
for affording the essential protections of the adult criminal process while 
preserving the rehabilitative goals, confidentiality, and other benevolent 
features of the juvenile court process.”55  The years following the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Gault saw a continued expansion of juveniles’ due 
process rights and a restructuring of the juvenile court system so it more 
closely resembled the adult system in terms of procedural process 
protections.  At the same time, the new juvenile courts remained distinct by  
preserving the system’s original goals: flexibility, rehabilitation, 
confidentiality, and other benevolent features unique to the juvenile 
system.56 
B. Goals of the Modern Juvenile Justice System 
The United States Supreme Court, beginning with its decision in In re 
Gault, acknowledged the inherent differences between the adult and 
                                                                                                                          
51 Id. at 588. 
52 Id. at 588–89 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
53 387 U.S. 1 (1967).  Gerald Gault was fifteen when he was adjudicated delinquent.  The juvenile 
court, in exercising the discretion afforded to it by the Arizona Juvenile Code, committed Gault to a 
State Industrial School “for the period of his minority, unless sooner discharged by due process of 
law.”  Id. at 7–8.  The Supreme Court of Arizona found that the Code was invalid because it permitted 
a juvenile to be committed to a state institution in proceedings in which the court had “virtually 
unlimited discretion.”  Id. at 10. 
54  Id. at 18 n.23 (citing Kent v. US, 383 US 541, 556 (1966)).  
55  Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries, and Justice: Ensuring the 
Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 558 (1998). 
56 See id; Berkheiser, supra note 43, at 593.  
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juvenile justice systems, and emphasized that, where the goals of the adult 
criminal justice system are deterrence and retribution, the goals of the 
juvenile justice system should balance the goals of accountability with 
those of rehabilitation and the best interest of the child.57 
Connecticut, too, acknowledges the inherent differences between the 
two systems, and, through its courts and legislature, has tried “to strike a 
balance—to respect the informality and flexibility that characterize 
juvenile proceedings . . . and yet to ensure that such proceedings comport 
with the fundamental fairness demanded by the Due Process Clause.”58  
The handling of juvenile matters in Connecticut exemplifies the “attempt 
to balance fundamental fairness with the unique characteristics of the 
juvenile justice system. . . .”59  According to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-121h, 
the “juvenile justice system [is intended to] provide individualized 
supervision, care, accountability and treatment in a manner consistent with 
public safety to those juveniles who violate the law.”60  The statute 
recognizes that, while one goal is to “[h]old juveniles accountable for their 
unlawful behavior,” punishment must be balanced against efforts to 
reintegrate the juvenile into society.61  The statute provides for “programs 
and services that are community-based and are provided in close proximity 
to the juvenile’s community,” seeks to “[r]etain and support juveniles in 
their homes whenever possible and appropriate,” and “[p]romote[s] the 
development and implementation of community-based programs including, 
but not limited to, mental health services, designed to prevent unlawful 
behavior and to effectively minimize the depth and duration of the 
juvenile’s involvement in the juvenile justice system.”62  “Thus, it is clear 
that [Conn. Gen. Stat.] § 46b-121h includes both rehabilitation and 
accountability as desired goals of the juvenile justice system.”63 
IV. WAIVER 
As we have seen, the juvenile justice system emerged as separate and 
distinct from the adult justice system with an eye towards rehabilitation of 
minors, as opposed to mere punishment and retribution.  The juvenile 
system recognizes that the characteristics and needs of juvenile offenders 
                                                                                                                          
57 See In re Jason C., 767 A.2d 710, 717 (Conn. 2001); Michelle Haddad, Catching Up: The Need 
for New York State to Amend Its Juvenile Offender Law to Reflect Psychiatric, Constitutional and 
Normative National Trends Over the Last Three Decades, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 455, 
457 (2009) (distinguishing the goals of the modern juvenile justice system from those of the adult 
system). 
58 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
59 In re Jason C., 767 A.2d 710, 718 (Conn. 2001). 
60 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-121h (2011).  
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 In re Jason C., 767 A.2d at 717 n.12. 
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are different than those of their adult counterparts, and as such juvenile 
offenders require a separate system for the administration of justice.64  
While the juvenile system is distinct from the adult system in terms of its 
goals and enhanced judicial discretion, it has become increasingly similar 
to the adult system in terms of its processes and procedural protections.  As 
the two systems become more similar, it raises questions as to whether the 
juvenile justice system should not only adapt the protections afforded to 
defendants in the adult system, but also other procedures inherent in the 
adult system. 
In considering this expansion of processes, it seems there would be a 
split in opinion regarding an extension of the adult justice system’s 
interpretation of actions or omissions on the part of the defendant that 
might constitute a waiver of the right to bring up that issue at a later date.  
One school of thought would argue that, because the courts have extended 
due process, almost in its entirety, to the juvenile justice system and 
applied its protections strictly, the juvenile courts should adopt the adult 
system’s notion of waiver strictly as well.  If a juvenile defendant has the 
right to counsel, just as an adult does, should he not be able to waive his 
right to counsel just as easily as an adult defendant?  The other school of 
thought regarding juvenile waiver would argue that in order to preserve the 
fundamental fairness premise on which the juvenile justice system was 
founded–flexibility–the adult system’s notion of waiver should be adopted, 
but applied with judicial discretion.  For example, where an adult 
defendant’s silence regarding improper jury instructions may result in an 
inability to object to the jury instructions on appeal, that claim may be 
preserved where a juvenile defendant makes a similar omission. 
A. Waiver, Generally 
The adult procedure that lies at the heart of this Note’s analysis of the 
juvenile justice system, generally, and of In re Fabian A., specifically, is 
waiver.   In Johnson v. Zerbst, the Supreme Court held that the commonly 
recognized test for waiver of any right is “ordinarily an intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”65  In order 
to determine whether a defendant has validly waived a right requires that 
the court determine the person’s knowledge or intent with regards to the 
relinquishment of that right.  Namely, “[t]he rights holder first must know 
of the right and then make an intentional choice to relinquish it.  
Otherwise, there is no waiver.”66  However, a look at the decisions of 
                                                                                                                          
64 See 47 AM. JUR. 2D Juvenile Courts, Etc. § 4 (2006). 
65 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); see Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 161 (1957) 
(extending the “competent and intelligent” standard to state court proceedings). 
66 Berkheiser, supra note 43, at 601. 
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courts throughout the country, federal and state, adult and juvenile, 
demonstrates that courts no longer adhere to the strict requirement that the 
rights-holder explicitly or intentionally choose to waive the right in 
dispute. 
B. Waiver in Connecticut 
In Connecticut, waiver is defined by not only the Connecticut Practice 
Book, but also by the Connecticut judiciary.  For example, the Connecticut 
Practice Book is clear that, if an attorney fails to object or file a motion to 
dismiss within a reasonable amount of time, he fails to preserve his claim 
and is deemed to have waived his right to raise the issue at a later time 
(generally, on appeal).67  Further, the “failure of a defendant not in 
custody, absent good cause shown, to appear after notice, shall constitute a 
waiver of that right and of any objection to the taking and use of the 
deposition based upon that right.”68  Clearly the Connecticut Practice Book 
deems a failure to positively act in a timely matter, be it filing a motion or 
appearing in court, to be an implicit waiver of the right that would 
otherwise be preserved.  The Connecticut Supreme Court has held 
similarly.69 
However, the Connecticut courts have gone further to define specific 
omissions on the part of counsel in adult proceedings as constituting 
waiver.  Namely, the Connecticut courts are in consensus in finding that a 
failure to object or raise a claim–during trial or pretrial proceedings (more 
specifically a plea canvass)–results in an inability to raise the claim at a 
later point in time.  For example, the Connecticut Appellate Court held that 
an attorney’s failure to object to juror misconduct constitutes waiver.70  
Furthermore, the Appellate Court also held that failing to object to a 
court’s ruling constitutes waiver.71  The Connecticut courts have ruled 
similarly in matters where a defendant’s fundamental rights are at issue.  
For example, the Appellate Court held that, where defense counsel fails to 
object to the State not proving each element of a crime, such omission 
                                                                                                                          
67 See CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 10-32 (deeming “[a]ny claim of lack of jurisdiction over the person 
or improper venue or insufficiency of process or insufficiency of service of process [to be] waived if 
not raised by a motion to dismiss filed” in a timely manner); see also CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 42-1  
(stating that “a failure to elect a jury trial” at the time the court informs the defendant of his right to a 
jury trial “may constitute a waiver of that right.”). 
68 CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 40-55.  
69 See Kim v. Magnotta, 733 A.2d 809, 813 (Conn. 1999) (holding that lack of personal 
jurisdiction may be waived, unless challenged by a motion to dismiss filed in a timely manner); 
Lostritto v. Cmty. Action Agency of New Haven, Inc., 848 A.2d 418, 431 (Conn. 2004) (holding that a 
challenge to personal jurisdiction is waived if it is not raised in a motion to dismiss within 30 days of 
the filing of a complaint). 
70 State v. Tyson, 862 A.2d 363, 366 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004). 
71 State v. Lynch, 1 A.3d 1254, 1263–64 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010). 
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constitutes waiver.72  It later laid out the blanket rule that a defendant in 
criminal prosecution may waive one or more of his fundamental rights.73  
Most relevant to the case of In re Fabian A., however, is the Connecticut 
Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Golding that a failure on the part of a 
defense attorney to object to jury instructions constitutes waiver.74  If we 
are to read the Golding decision strictly, it would seem as though the 
Connecticut courts do not require that a waiver be explicit, even in 
situations where an objection may be directed towards the court’s 
procedure. 
So far, the courts in Connecticut have refused to extend the strict 
interpretation of failure to object as constituting waiver from the adult 
justice system to the juvenile system.  However, it is worth noting that 
implicit waiver is not a completely foreign notion within the Connecticut 
juvenile justice system.  In In re Adrien C., the Connecticut Appellate 
Court held that a mother waived her right to contest the court’s jurisdiction 
when she failed to comply with the thirty-day requirement for filing a 
motion to dismiss the State’s claim.75  The Connecticut Superior Court 
followed suit, holding that a mother’s failure to object to the late 
scheduling of an initial hearing regarding the termination of her parental 
rights “constitute[d] a waiver of any right she might have to do so.”76  
Again, the court interpreted an adult’s failure to object as waiver.  
However, what is still relevant is the court’s reasoning for interpreting 
such omission as waiver.  The court in In re Adrien C. emphasized, and the 
court in In re Samantha B. reiterated, that the time restriction on filing a 
motion to dismiss was the result of legislative concerns for delay in the 
juvenile process and as a way to promote the best interest of the child 
involved.77  Admittedly, there are vast differences between a juvenile 
delinquency hearing and a termination of parental rights hearing; however, 
a unifying theme between the two is the court’s attention to the best 
interest of the child (or minor) involved. 
                                                                                                                          
72 State v. Cooper, 664 A.2d 773, 777 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995). 
73 State v. Hudson, 998 A.2d 1272, 1278 (Conn. App. 2010), cert. denied, 4 A.3d 1229 (Conn. 
2010). 
74 State v. Golding, 567 A.2d 823 (Conn. 1989).  It is important to note that the Court’s decision 
in Golding has narrow application.  The Court stated that a failure to object will only constitute waiver 
if four criteria are met: “(1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is 
of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional 
violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless 
error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 827. 
75 In re Adrien C., 519 A.2d 1241, 1245–46 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987). 
76 In re Samantha B., 722 A.2d 300, 300 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997). 
77 In re Adrien C., 519 A.2d at 1245. 
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C. Waiver in Other Jurisdictions 
There is a great weight of federal authority supporting the notion that, 
by failing to object, defense counsel waives the right to pursue a claim on 
appeal.  For example, the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Gagnon held that, in 
the absence of an objection, the defendant had waived his right to be 
present at all stages of his criminal trial.78  In Levine v. U.S., the Court held 
that counsel’s failure to object to the closing of a courtroom was a waiver 
of the right to a public trial.79  Finally, in U.S. v. Bascaro, the Eleventh 
Circuit Court held that, because defendant raised the defense of double 
jeopardy for the first time on appeal after failing to raise an objection to the 
charges at trial, he had waived his right to assert such a defense.80  The 
federal courts are clear regarding waiver in adult proceedings:  unless 
defense counsel makes an objection during trial (or during a pretrial 
hearing), he is deemed to have waived the right to argue the specific 
claim–no matter how fundamental a right the claim is asserting to protect–
at a later date. 
State courts throughout the country generally follow the same rule and 
accept that an adult defendant may implicitly waive various rights.  The 
Tennessee Supreme Court held in State v. Walker that a conspiracy 
defendant’s failure to object at trial to the admission of his co-conspirator’s 
statements made to the defendant’s sister constituted a waiver of his right 
to raise the issue in his motion for a new trial.81  In State v. Gove, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the defendant had waived his right to 
challenge on appeal that the trial court, in a witness unavailability ruling, 
violated his right to confront his accuser when he failed to object to the 
court’s ruling during trial.82  Finally, the Maryland Court of Appeals held 
in Berry v. State that defense counsel’s failure to object to the admission of 
handgun evidence constituted a waiver of defendant’s right to raise the 
evidence’s admission on appeal.83  State courts, like their federal 
counterparts, rigidly interpret an attorney’s failure to object as constituting 
waiver.  But how rigidly should state juvenile courts apply the waiver 
standard to a juvenile defense counsel’s failure to object? 
Cases regarding waiver, implicit and explicit alike, in juvenile settings 
are much more limited.  However, the cases identified by this author seem 
to point to a tendency among courts to strictly interpret juvenile defense 
counsel’s initial failure to object as a waiver of the right to pursue the 
claim at a later time.  For example, the Utah Supreme Court held in State 
                                                                                                                          
78 U.S. v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 528 (1985). 
79 Levine v. U.S., 362 U.S. 610, 619 (1960). 
80 U.S. v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335, 1365 (11th Cir. 1984). 
81 State v. Walker, 910 S.W.2d 381, 388 (Tenn. 1995). 
82 State v. Gove, 437 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Wis. 1989). 
83 Berry v. State, 843 A.2d 93, 109 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004). 
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ex rel. Christensen v. Christensen that a defendant waived his right to 
object, on appeal, to the admission of testimony “as to matters which were 
not embraced within the allegations of the petition for rehearing of the 
case” because defense counsel “failed to object to the admission of such 
testimony at the hearing.”84  In North Dakota, its Supreme Court held in In 
the Interest of R.D.B. that a juvenile who was with his parents at the time 
of a juvenile court proceeding effectively waived his right to counsel, and 
that he “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived [his] right to 
counsel at the adjudicatory hearing.” 85  The court went on to reject the 
claim that a waiver of the right to counsel should be valid only when the 
representation given by the parents is of the same caliber as the child 
would have received from an attorney.86  Thus, the court emphasized that 
the juvenile defendant’s waiver need not be explicit to prevent him from 
objecting to inefficient or lack of counsel on appeal; rather, the mere 
representation by his parents sufficiently constituted waiver. 
D. Waiver of Counsel in the Juvenile Setting as a Model 
Unfortunately, there seems to be no case law or statutory guidance for 
determining whether defense counsel’s failure to object to an insufficient 
plea canvass may constitute waiver in a juvenile court setting.  However, 
there has been extensive research conducted regarding implicit waiver with 
regards to defendants’ right to counsel in juvenile delinquency hearings.  
While the right to counsel derives more directly from due process 
protections found in the Constitution, both the right to counsel and 
informed consent affect whether a juvenile defendant receives a fair trial, 
which is also a constitutionally-based right. 
In her article The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the 
Juvenile Courts, Mary Berkheiser refers to a myriad of “social-
psychological studies showing that most children are developmentally 
incapable of exercising a valid waiver.”87  The studies reveal that 
“juveniles as a class have limited decisionmaking abilities, lack an 
adequate understanding of their legal rights, and as a result are incapable of 
exercising an effective waiver.”88  If this inability on the part of juveniles 
                                                                                                                          
84 State ex rel. Christensen v. Christensen, 227 P.2d 760, 762–63 (Utah 1951).  It is important to 
note that this case was decided before the Supreme Court’s decision in In re Gault, which extended 
procedural protections to the juvenile justice system.  However, this decision is still good law in Utah 
and is therefore a good example of how some states apply not only rigid adult procedural protections to 
juvenile matters, but a rigid interpretation of failure to object as constituting waiver. 
85 In re R.D.B., 575 N.W.2d 420, 423 (N.D. 1998). 
86 Id. 
87 Berkheiser, supra note 43, at 581. 
88 Id.  See generally Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability & Competency in Juveniles: A Study of 
17 Cases, 15 CRIM. JUST. 26 (2000); Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge’s Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a 
Child’s Capacity to Choose, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1873 (1996). 
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to even explicitly waive their right to counsel is true, one can easily argue 
that under no circumstances can a juvenile defendant implicitly waive his 
right to counsel merely by failing to object to lack of counsel’s presence at 
any stage of the judicial proceedings.  
Further, the Connecticut Supreme Court often warned that judges 
“should indulge ‘every reasonable presumption’ against waiver” where 
defendants’ constitutional rights are at stake.89  “Yet juvenile court 
practices as revealed in the reported cases [of waiver of right to counsel] 
demonstrate a total disregard for that presumption.”90  As a result, there 
have been many cases where juvenile court judges have found “waiver by 
inaction.”91  For example, in In re Christopher T., when a juvenile 
defendant showed up for his adjudication hearing without counsel, the 
court inferred that he had waived his right to counsel and, as a result, 
proceeded directly to adjudication.92  This trend of finding “waiver by 
inaction” occurs even in states with detailed statutes that identify and limit 
circumstances under which a judge may accept that a juvenile defendant 
has waived his right to counsel. 93 
There are many cases that indicate juvenile court judges have a 
tendency to infer juvenile defendants’ waiver of their right to counsel “by 
inaction.”  However, there has been a trend among appellate courts to 
reverse trial decisions based on an abuse of discretion by the trial court 
judge in finding that the juvenile defendant had implicitly waived his right 
to counsel.94  This trend is hopeful and it serves to reinforce the 
fundamental principle of Gault that none of the due process protections it 
mandated should undermine the beneficial qualities of juvenile court 
proceedings.95  Taking this statement at face value, one may infer that the 
Gault Court sought to strike a balance between strict application of due 
process protections in all juvenile settings against the preservation of 
judicial discretion to be used in situations that may not warrant such a rigid 
                                                                                                                          
89 Berkheiser, supra note 43, at 611. 
90 Id. 
91 In re Christopher T., 740 A.2d 69, 71 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999). 
92 Id. 
93 Berkheiser, supra note 42, at 617.  Berkheiser specifically focuses her analysis on Florida, 
which has one of the most specific waiver rules of any state: “Rule 8.165 of the Florida Rules of 
Juvenile Procedure requires the court to advise the child of his or her right to counsel and to appoint 
counsel ‘unless waived by the child at each stage of the proceedings.’”  Id. at 618.  However, Florida 
has one of the highest rates of appellate decisions overturning juvenile waiver of right to counsel based 
on noncompliance with state statute.  Id at 618, 661-60. 
94 See McBride v. Jacobs, 247 F.2d 595, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (holding that, where the court had 
informed the juvenile defendant’s mother of his right to counsel but failed to notify the defendant 
himself, any waiver, by parent or child, must be “an intelligent, knowing act”); Shioutakon v. District 
of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666, 670, 670 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (holding that “where the [right to counsel] 
exists, the court must be assured that any waiver of it is intelligent and competent,” as determined by 
the child’s “age, education, and information, and all other pertinent facts”). 
95 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 25–27 (1967). 
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application of the due process doctrine. 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF EXTENDING STRICT WAIVER RULES TO 
THE JUVENILE SYSTEM 
As the previous section illustrated, courts throughout the country, 
including those in Connecticut, are relatively unanimous in their decisions 
interpreting an attorney’s failure to object as a waiver of the right to raise 
the claim in later proceedings.  This interpretation of attorney silence as 
waiver holds true not just in adult adjudicatory settings, but in the juvenile 
justice system, as well.  So I pose the question: Should it? 
A. Recommendations for Connecticut 
It is clear that the divide in opinion regarding a strict application of 
waiver to the juvenile justice system may have an impact on the system’s 
procedural flexibility and general attainment of its goals.  For example, as 
applied to In re Fabian A., if we are to strictly adhere to the adult justice 
system’s notions of waiver, Fabian A.’s attorney would be deemed to have 
waived his client’s right to an appeal based on the fact that he failed to 
object to the judge’s insufficient canvass. As a result his client’s plea was 
not made knowingly or voluntarily.  However, if we are to adopt a more 
lenient interpretation of waiver in the juvenile justice system (as would be 
in line with the system’s generally flexible character), one might argue that 
in order for a minor to waive his right to an appeal, the waiver must be 
explicit, rather than a mere failure to object.  In this case, Fabian A.’s right 
to an appeal would be preserved, regardless of the fact that his attorney 
failed to object to the deficient canvass. 
So what is Connecticut to do?  Unfortunately, “neither the presumption 
against waiver nor the enactment of detailed statutory waiver procedures 
have been effective constraints against juvenile court judges’ continued 
exercise of their ‘discretion’ to deny juveniles their right to counsel.”96  
This statement illustrates the catch-22 that lies at the heart of the juvenile 
justice system: on one hand, judicial discretion preserves the flexibility and 
individualized attention upon which the juvenile justice system was 
founded; on the other hand, judicial discretion allows a judge to ignore 
statutory due process requirements, such as right to counsel, under the 
guise of addressing the child’s best interest.  The latter instance is quite 
distressing.  For that reason, I would recommend that Connecticut not only 
pass a statute that implements a strict no-waiver policy, unless the waiver 
is explicit and made in writing, but also go a step further and include in it 
the threat of sanctions against any judge that violates the no-waiver policy.  
                                                                                                                          
96 Berkheiser, supra note 42, at 611. 
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Though such a rigid, and arguably severe, rule goes against juvenile justice 
notions of flexibility and discretion, such a statute may counteract the 
possible abuse of discretion by juvenile court when deciding whether to 
preserve a defendant’s claim by placing judges who abuse their discretion 
at risk of sanctions. 
B. Implications for In re Fabian A. 
The United States Supreme Court and legal scholars alike have long 
recognized that “the right to counsel is fundamental to the exercise of other 
procedural rights by those accused of criminal acts.  As early as 1932, the 
Court stated that without the ‘guiding hand of counsel,’ an accused’s ‘right 
to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail.’”97  Unfortunately, as 
seen in the case of Fabian A., counsel is not always adequate or effective in 
advocating and protecting a juvenile defendant’s best interest and 
fundamental rights.  As I recommended in the previous section, 
Connecticut juvenile courts should move away from the national state 
court trend of rigidly interpreting counsel’s failure to object as a waiver, 
and instead allow for judicial discretion in instances where counsel’s 
failure to object carries with it the potential for the juvenile defendant’s 
deprivation of liberty after entering a plea that is neither knowing nor 
voluntary.98  If Connecticut courts were to afford juvenile judges greater 
discretion, there is a chance that a court hearing Fabian A.’s case on appeal 
may allow the juvenile defendant to pursue the claim that his guilty plea 
was made neither knowingly nor voluntarily.  However, if the court 
disallows Fabian A. to pursue his claim (even in a judicial system that 
requires explicit waiver rather than a mere failure to object), he may be 
able to pursue an alternative course of action and bring a claim against his 
attorney for ineffective counsel.  Allowing such a claim would not only 
encourage juvenile defense attorneys to be more attentive during plea 
canvasses (especially in the case of Fabian A., where defense counsel even 
failed to object to the canvass after the prosecuting attorney raised the 
issue of insufficiency), but may also allow juvenile defendants who would 
otherwise not be able to appeal an extension of commitment to do so. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The history of the juvenile justice system is defined by dueling 
opinions as to how juvenile defendants should be treated.  At its inception, 
the “juvenile court replicated the historical parens patriae practice of the 
courts of chancery in England and the United States to exercise jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                          
97 Id. at 580 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)). 
98 A possible repercussion for judges who abuse this discretion could be sanctions. 
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for the protection of the unfortunate child[,]” focusing on benevolence and 
intervention as opposed to punishment and retribution.99  Because their 
focus was on a child’s best interest, rather than merely locking him or her 
up and throwing away the key, early juvenile courts saw the due process 
procedural protections inherent to adult courts as unnecessary in their 
newly-established judicial sphere.100  Judicial reformers challenged the 
view that, because the juvenile court was a benevolent parent, focused on 
serving the juvenile defendant’s best interest.  They pointed out that, in 
reality, the juvenile court system afforded children “fewer rights under the 
law, based on the children’s presumed lack of capacity to exercise good 
judgment.”101  As such, the juvenile court system began a procedural 
movement increasingly similar to its adult counterpart, specifically by 
adapting due process protections inherent in the adult system. 
The divide between the adult and juvenile court systems has been 
gradually narrowing as juvenile courts continue to adapt procedural 
protections and procedural rigidity.  An examination of courts across the 
country shows a clear trend among juvenile judges to rigidly apply adult 
procedure regarding failure to object and implicit waiver.  This trend is 
incongruous with the fundamental premises upon which the juvenile 
system is based–flexibility and fundamental fairness.  As a result, juvenile 
defendants–whom the courts have identified as not only unique from their 
adult counterparts but who may also lack the capacity and maturity to fully 
understand their legal situation or consequences–are often deprived of 
many rights and opportunities a less rigid and more discretionary system 
might—and should—afford them. 
By analyzing the history of the juvenile justice system and tracking 
court trends regarding due process and waiver, this Note attempted to 
address the issues raised by the Connecticut Superior Court in the case of 
In re Fabian A.  While it is, as of now, unclear which way the court will 
rule on the basis of waiver, the decision either way will be a watershed 
decision regarding Connecticut courts’ stance on the rigid interpretation of 
absence of objection as constituting waiver. 
  
                                                                                                                          
99 Id. at 586 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
100 Id. at 587. 
101 Id. at 623. 

